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Proposal for a Non-Subsidized,
Non-Retirement-Plan, Employee-Owned
Investment Vehicle to Replace the ESOP
SEAN ANDERSON*
ANDREW MORRISON STUMPFF**
Abstract
Numerous observers, including both authors, have raised questions about
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), which are a specialized category
of retirement plan intended to invest primarily in securities issued by the
sponsoring employer. Such arrangements are actively encouraged under federal law, as qualified retirement plans under section 401(a) and as eligible for
significant additional, ESOP-specific tax subsidies. By design, ESOPs result
in employees becoming effectively the owners of their own employer, via beneficial ownership of stock held by the plan. Although this idea can sound
attractive, many have expressed concern from the standpoint of retirement
policy: ESOPs have the effect of concentrating employees’ retirement assets in
a single stock—which would be troubling enough if the concentration were
in any stock, but is much more so given that, in an ESOP, the concentrated
investment is in employer stock. Risk of catastrophic loss of retirement security is thus simultaneously aggravated through lack of investment diversification and directly correlated with risk of job loss.
In this Article, however, the authors suggest that while ESOPs as currently
constituted and subsidized are difficult to defend, nonetheless in some circumstances persuasive policy arguments exist for continuing to permit—
and in special cases even encouraging—collective employee ownership of
employer securities. Such arrangements should simply not be structured or
regulated under the retirement system. For example, sometimes the proprietor
of a business wishes to retire or otherwise liquidate his or her holdings, but
no viable buyer can be found. In that situation—a not-uncommon context
for creation of ESOPs, currently—it can often be argued that the best, most
efficient available result may be for the company’s employees to join together,
secure financing on some collective basis, and purchase and continue to operate the business themselves.
* Teaching Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
** Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School; Adjunct Professor, University of Alabama
Law School. The authors thank Peter Wiedenbeck, as well as participants at the Conference
on ERISA, Employee Benefits, and Social Insurance conducted in March 2014 at Marquette
University Law School, for comments on an earlier draft.
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Under state and federal securities laws, however, it is currently far from
clear whether such an arrangement could feasibly be established except by
using an ESOP: that is, by using a retirement plan. We accordingly propose
that the current retirement-based, tax-subsidized ESOP model of employer
stock ownership be replaced by a new type of arrangement that would be
treated and regulated as an investment vehicle by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, much like a mutual fund, rather than by the Department of
Labor and the Service under the U.S. retirement-plan system. Employee
protections would be borrowed from the existing ESOP regime. Current
retirement-plan tax subsidies would be eliminated, but the specific tax-deferral subsidy now available under section 1042 for security sales to employerstock plans would be continued and even enhanced, albeit better targeted to
arrangements for which the public subsidy makes sense.
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I. Introduction
Federal law both authorizes and subsidizes employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs)—retirement plans that invest primarily in the stock of the sponsoring employers. Elsewhere, we (and others) have explained why it is bad policy
to treat ESOPs as retirement plans and to encourage them with subsidies.1
Here, we suggest that in certain circumstances, it makes sense for the law
to authorize an investment vehicle that allows a company’s employees to buy
the company’s stock. The emblematic case where such a vehicle makes sense
is one in which a small or mid-sized company’s founding shareholder seeks to
retire, and no buyer appears who is willing to operate the company as a going
concern. In such a scenario, employee ownership might be preferable to the
company’s demise. Yet it is at least unclear under existing law whether a nonESOP employee-ownership vehicle would be viable.
Even in those circumstances, the employee-investment vehicle (which we
dub a “TEST,” for “taxable employee stock trust”) should not be treated as a
retirement plan. Instead, it should be regulated under federal securities laws.
Furthermore, with limited exceptions, TESTs should not be subsidized.
II. ESOP Background and Criticisms
An ESOP is a retirement plan designed to invest its assets primarily in stock
of the sponsoring employer.2 Current federal law allows ESOPs to exist as
qualified pension plans3 by means of exceptions from rules that would otherwise outlaw them, and it encourages employers to adopt and maintain ESOPs
by offering tax subsidies. As both of us have written before, that combination

1
Sean M. Anderson, Risky Retirement Business: How ESOPs Harm the Workers They Are Supposed to Help, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Anderson, Risky Retirement Business];
Andrew Stumpff & Norman Stein, Repeal Tax Incentives for ESOPs, 125 Tax Notes (TA)
337 (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Stumpff & Stein, Repeal Tax Incentives]. Many others have
made similar arguments. See, e.g., William K. Bortz, The Problem With ESOPs, 147 Tax Notes
(TA) 327 (Apr. 20, 2015); John H. Langbein, Testimony to Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Jan. 24, 2002), reprinted as What’s Wrong with Employer Stock Pension Plans, in
Enron and other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal Reader 487 (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2d ed. 2009); David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of
Worker Ownership, 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 113 (2002); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker
Ownership Work?, 99 Yale L.J. 1749, 1811–12 (1990); William R. Levin, The False Promise
of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 Yale L.J.
148, 165–70 (1985). That we have ESOPs at all is the historical result of lobbying by an idiosyncratic economist, Louis Kelso, during the 1960s and 1970s. See Andrew Stumpff, Fifty Years
of Utopia: A Half-Century after Louis Kelso’s The Capitalist Manifesto, a Look Back at the Weird
History of the ESOP, 62 Tax Law. 419 (2009) [hereinafter Stumpff, Fifty Years].
2
See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7).
3
A qualified pension plan is one that complies with the voluminous and complicated
requirements of section 401(a), thereby qualifying for favorable tax treatment. See infra note
11 and accompanying text. References to a “section” are to a section of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (Code), unless otherwise indicated.
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of exceptions and incentives is bad retirement policy.4 In this Part, we briefly
describe the main ESOP-favoring provisions of federal law, recap the main
objections to treating ESOPs as retirement plans, and criticize the notion that
employee ownership ought to be subsidized.
A. Federal Laws Allowing and Subsidizing ESOPs
Without special exceptions, ESOPs would violate several rules applicable
generally to pension plans under ERISA and the Code. First, ESOPs and
most other defined contribution pension plans are exempt from a rule that
bars plans from holding more than ten percent of their assets in the form of
employer stock.5
Second, most purchases and sales of employer stock by an ESOP would
be “prohibited transactions”6 were it not for a statutory exception allowing
ESOPs and other “eligible individual account plans” to transact in “qualifying
employer securities.”7
Third, the arrangements whereby “leveraged” ESOPs borrow money to
finance the purchase of employer stock would, ordinarily, be prohibited transactions themselves. In leveraged ESOP transactions, the sponsoring employer
commonly either lends the ESOP money or guarantees a loan to the ESOP
by a commercial lender. Only an ESOP-specific exception saves those loans
and guarantees from being prohibited transactions.8
Finally, ERISA ordinarily requires the “fiduciaries” who administer pension
plans to diversify investments “unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so.”9 Because ESOPs, by definition, invest primarily or
exclusively in the stock of a single company, ESOP fiduciaries routinely violate the diversification norm. ERISA, however, provides an exception allowing eligible individual account plans, including ESOPs, to acquire and hold
employer stock unfettered by the duty of diversification.10
Besides excepting ESOPs from rules that they would otherwise violate,
federal law provides an incentive for ESOPs. First, ESOPs share with other
qualified plans the advantage of decoupling the tax consequences of plan
4
See Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 6–23; Stumpff & Stein, Repeal Tax
Incentives, supra note 1, at 338–40.
5
ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2).
6
Both ERISA and the Code include prohibited transaction provisions. I.R.C. § 4975;
ERISA §§ 406, 408, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108. Because the Code provisions apply specifically
to qualified pension plans, including ESOPs, we will refer to the Code provisions, although
any differences between the Code and ERISA in this regard are unlikely to matter.
7
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(13) (citing ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)).
8
See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(C) (including sponsoring employer as disqualified person);
(c)(1)(B) (listing as a prohibited transaction any “lending of money or other extension of
credit between a plan and a disqualified person”); (d)(3) (excepting from prohibited transaction prohibitions, under specified circumstances, “any loan to a leveraged employee stock
ownership plan”).
9
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
10
ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
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contributions for the employer and the employee. The employer may deduct
contributions when it makes them, but each employee-participant can wait
to include the contributions as income until he or she withdraws them from
the plan, years or decades later.11
ESOPs also receive additional tax incentives. Often, a person selling
employer stock to an ESOP can indefinitely defer recognizing and paying
taxes on the gain from the sale.12 The sponsoring employer may deduct from
its taxable income dividends paid on ESOP stock, and distribution of those
dividends is exempt from a ten percent tax usually applied to premature distributions from qualified plans.13 Shares of employer stock distributed from a
qualified plan, including an ESOP, also receive favorable tax treatment with
respect to net unrealized appreciation, allowing, in some circumstances, for a
permanent exclusion from income.14
Notably, nowhere in the tax or ERISA rules governing ESOPs will one find
any requirement that employees have any choice as to whether to participate. A company’s management may implement an ESOP with or without its
workers’ approval, and employees need not (and ordinarily do not) have any
ability to opt out of the ESOP and receive, instead, either extra compensation
or contributions to some other retirement plan.
B. Objections to ESOPs as Subsidized Retirement Plans
1. ESOPs Are Indefensible as Retirement Vehicles
The fact that federal law treats ESOPs as retirement plans results from
historical accident rather than thoughtful design.15 As it turns out, ESOPs
are singularly inappropriate as retirement plans—that is, as instruments for
focusing tax incentives for the purpose of helping individuals finance their
retirement years. What follows is a brief summary of the chief reasons for that
conclusion, which we have elaborated more fully elsewhere.16
The central reason why ESOPs represent bad retirement policy is that they
are inherently undiversified. More than a half-century of theoretical and
empirical scholarship has elaborated on the principle that a diversified portfolio of investments is preferable, ex ante, to a concentrated investment in
a single security. The reason, albeit complicated in its details and permutations, is simple in its essence: An investment in a single security, such as stock
in one company, carries with it all the risks associated with that company,
11
See I.R.C. §§ 404 (governing deduction for employer’s contributions); 402 (governing
taxability of distributions).
12
See I.R.C. § 1042.
13
I.R.C. §§ 404(k), 72(t)(2)(A)(vi).
14
See I.R.C. § 402(e)(4); Stumpff & Stein, Repeal Tax Incentives, supra note 1, at 338.
15
For a recounting of the development of these arrangements, see Stumpff, Fifty Years, supra
note 1.
16
Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 6–13; Stumpff & Stein, Repeal Tax
Incentives, supra note 1, at 338–40.
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the industry in which it operates, its geographic location, and the like. That
single-security investment also carries with it risks specific to its asset classequity investment. A portfolio of investments, on the other hand, can include
multiple classes of investments, including securities of multiple companies,
in multiple industries and locations, whose risks can to a significant degree
offset one another.
An ESOP concentrates a great deal of each participant’s retirement savings
in employer stock, creating an undiversified position. If the employer goes
out of business, or its stock otherwise “tanks,” the value of ESOP participants’
retirement savings will plummet. Even barring such catastrophes, the undiversified character of the ESOP investment will, on average, result in ESOP
participants having less to live on in retirement than if the employer had
contributed instead to a pension plan with properly diversified investments.17
Moreover, an ESOP’s lack of diversification serves to compound employees’ inherently undiversified investment of “human capital.”18 If the employer
goes out of business, or reduces its workforce due to dire financial difficulties, some or all of its employees will lose their jobs and non-retirement benefits, such as subsidized medical insurance. If their retirement savings are in
an ESOP, they stand to lose some or all of their retirement savings in the
same stroke.
Defenders frequently point to examples where ESOP companies have done
well.19 But, of course, against these anecdotal examples can be assembled quite
a few countervailing ones involving ESOPs that have lost much, and in some
cases effectively all, of their value.20 Anecdotal evidence is unilluminating.
That some individuals have won the lottery does not prove that concentrated
investment in lottery tickets is a good investment approach. Statistically, it
is a fact that many companies will fail and some will succeed; sound public
retirement policy favors a system under which workers, while they may not
have a high prospect of astronomic gain, also do not face significant risk of
catastrophic loss, over a system in which there are many big winners and
many big losers. Even if it could be shown that the average ESOP company
does better economically than the average non-ESOP company, that would
not lessen the need for diversification. Some ESOP companies will fail, and
their employees’ retirements should be protected against this risk.
In this regard, we note that a company’s workers, even collectively, may
have little or no control over whether the lottery ticket they happen to hold
turns out to be a winner: They may, for example, simply be in the wrong
17
See Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly is It?, 48 J. L. & Econ.
443, 455–65 (2005) (Table IV); Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 8–10.
18
See Stumpff & Stein, Repeal Tax Incentives, supra note 1, at 339.
19
See, e.g., Joseph R. Blasi, Richard B. Freeman & Douglas L. Cruse, The Citizen’s
Share: Putting Ownership Back into Democracy 75–81 (2013).
20
ESOP sponsors have included the bankrupt companies Enron Corporation, Bear Stearns, Lehman, United Air Lines, WorldCom, and Chicago Tribune, among others. For further
examples, see Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 6–7.
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industry at the wrong time, as in the case of the failed Chicago Tribune ESOP
(among many others). There simply remains no reasonable doubt that diversification is the better investment practice.21
In addition to under-diversification, ESOPs also carry with them conflicts
of interest between company “insiders” and rank-and-file participants that
are more severe than those associated with other pension plans.22 Primarily
because ESOPs can borrow money, ESOPs can be used as tools of corporate
finance and succession planning. Such purposes are, to say the least, not coextensive with the purposes that, by law, must motivate those who administer
pension plans—maximizing retirement benefits and defraying reasonable
costs.23
2. ESOPs as “Extra” Compensation
As we have noted, the principal argument against ESOPs—that they entail
unjustified, undiversified investment risk for employees—has been made on
many previous occasions.24 We think, however, that special mention should
be made here of a frequent response to this contention, to the effect that our
concern about risk to employees is misplaced because ESOPs are additive and
do not reduce the other compensation received by employees.25 As a result,
this response goes, ESOP investment risk is irrelevant: Any gains accruing to
employees through the ESOP are extra to other compensation, and so even
if the ESOP turns out ultimately to be of little or no value, participants will
have been made no worse off than had the ESOP not been adopted. Under
this argument, ESOP participants can win but can never lose.
It cannot, however, be generally true that establishing an ESOP involves
paying compensation that is an extra amount over the pay employees would
otherwise receive. As a matter of logic and evidence, stock (or any in-kind)
compensation serves as a substitute for cash: The worker receives a smaller
paycheck and a forced, risky investment in her employer.
21
See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investment (2d ed. 1991); Paul A. Samuelson, General Proof that Diversification Pays, 2 J. Fin. &
Quantitative Anal. 1 (1967), among many others.
22
See Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 13–23.
23
See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (requiring plan fiduciaries to discharge duties to the plan “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan . . .”).
24
See sources cited supra note 1.
25
See Corey Rosen, Do ESOPs Need Reform? A Look at what the Data Tell Us, 147 Tax Notes
(TA) 1465, 1466 (June 22, 2015); Robert Buchele, Douglas L. Kruse, Loren Rodgers & Adria
Scharf, Show me the Money: Does Shared Capitalism Share the Wealth?, in Shared Capitalism
at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock
Options 362–65 (Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi eds., 2010). Usually the evidence offered is simply that a company also provides some other retirement plan
or that overall compensation at the company seems high. The intrinsic logical issues discussed
below do not seem to have been addressed, and the proffered evidence is furthermore inherently subject to the “survivors’ bias” problem: It fails to take into account companies that have,
for example due to bankruptcy, ceased to exist.
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For the ESOP proponents’ arguments to be tenable, not only must the
ESOP not be paid for from the workers’ current paychecks, but also the
ESOP must not be paid from the paychecks or retirement benefits the workers would have received in the future, had the ESOP not existed. It is difficult to see how this could possibly, even in theory, remain true over the
long run. The labor market can be presumed to set a competitive wage and
benefit level for a given job, and for ESOP companies to be routinely paying
in excess of that market level (by providing the compensation package they
would have anyway, plus the ESOP) would be per se unstable: All workers,
for example, should be expected to be flocking to ESOP companies, all the
time. Moreover, such above-market compensation would have to come from
somewhere, meaning ESOP companies would have to reduce other outlays
or continuously generate “extra” revenue over and above what was projected
in valuing the ESOP’s stock or both.26 In fact we believe most or all ESOP
sponsors themselves regard ESOP contributions as, at least in part, a component of the employees’ compensation, which is certainly how the plans are
marketed to employers and employees alike.
Only rarely, of course, is it possible to unravel empirically the basis on
which an ESOP has been established, and whether, in particular, it has been
adopted in lieu of other compensation. But at least one such instructive context does exist: that of union-negotiated compensation packages. Many publicly documented cases exist of union–management negotiations resulting in
the creation of an ESOP, and these confirm that, as logic would suggest, the
plans were included in the ultimately agreed compensation package as a negotiated, specific substitute for cash compensation that the union had sought.27
In any case, it is enough to observe that the Code imposes no requirement
that, as a condition to availing itself of those ESOP-related tax subsidies, a
company somehow show that its ESOP is additive to the pay and benefit
package the company would have provided anyway. And if ESOP benefits
are provided, even partially, instead of salary or retirement benefits otherwise
payable by the company, then the nondiversification objection seems insurmountable. In that case ESOPs will simply have had the effect of forcing a
risky concentration of employees’ investments.
3. Public Economic Incentives for Employee Ownership Are Indefensible
Beyond whether the law should treat ESOPs as retirement vehicles, a larger
question is whether they or similar employee stock arrangements should be
26
For elaboration of this point, see Andrew Stumpff, Perpetual Motion Machines: ESOPs Do
Not Pay For Themselves, 159 Tax Notes (TA) 1289 (May 28, 2018).
27
See, e.g., Charles Storch, UAL Deal a Hard Sell to Workers, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 10, 1989), Sec.
3, p. 1; David Hench, Portland Newspaper Guild to Vote on Concessions for Blethen Sale, Portland Press Herald (May 26, 2009), http://www.reclaimthemedia.org/corporate_power/
consolidation/portland_newspaper_guild_vote_2622.html; see also Robert J. Flanagan, Wage
Concessions and Long-Term Union Wage Flexibility, in 1 Brookings Paper on Economic
Activity 183, 207–08 (1984).
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publicly subsidized, in any form, through the tax law. ESOP advocates insist
that employee ownership, properly implemented, bestows competitive advantages, most notably by enhancing employees’ productivity.28 We are deeply
skeptical of that claim, for reasons one of us has described before.29 If the
claim is false, then in light of the objections summarized in Part II.B.1 above,
any general policy of subsidizing employee ownership seems at best perverse.
But the ultimately compelling point about incentives may be that, even if
(especially if ) the claim of increased productivity were true, it could not justify subsidies, whether in the form of tax advantages or otherwise. If ESOPs
convey a competitive advantage, one would suppose rational business managers would hasten to adopt them in the absence of any subsidy. Indeed,
under the assumption that, over the long run, markets behave appropriately
Darwinistically, the fact that ESOPs have not by now been universally (or
even particularly commonly) adopted by American companies—despite
decades not merely of availability but of active government subsidy—ought
to be taken as compelling evidence that such arrangements do not confer the
claimed competitive economic advantage.
C. Summary
For the reasons suggested above, Congress should repeal the exceptions in
the Code and ERISA that allow ESOPs to exist as qualified pension plans.
Furthermore, Congress should do away with the current favorable tax treatment of employee-ownership arrangements.
III. A Possibly Justified Exception: The Departing Founder Scenario
Part II summarized our related contentions that collective ownership by
employees of their employers should be neither (1) part of the retirement system nor (2) tax-subsidized. The question remains, however, whether collective employee ownership ought to be legally permitted, even if not subsidized,
and even if not as an element of retirement policy. As we describe in Part
IV, it is at least doubtful whether it would at present be legally permissible
or feasible to construct collective employee ownership in any way other than
through the tax-subsidized “retirement plan” ESOP model. Perhaps it should
be, at least under certain circumstances.
Imagine for example a small company, located in a small town, in a remote
area with few other locally situated employers. The founder wishes to retire
or has died. This seems a fairly common scenario.30 Everyone involved would
prefer the company to continue in operation, but the owner or estate does not
wish to sell to an outside buyer, or none has materialized.

See sources cited at Anderson, Risky Retirement Business, supra note 1, at 25–26 nn. 107–18.
Id. at 26–28, and sources cited therein.
30
This was originally the prototypical ESOP situation, as described in Stumpff, Fifty Years,
supra note 1, at 422.
28
29
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Such situations can transform a personal life-transition for a company’s
owner into a potentially calamitous, and possibly avoidable, economic event
for not only the directly affected workers but also the entire community.
In these cases, an impediment appears to exist to what might be the most
efficient and socially productive outcome—an impediment that prevents an
outside owner from materializing to continue an economically profitable
activity in the same location. The impediment may in many cases simply be
the physical site of company facilities. In others it may be that the company
is too small or occupies too narrow an economic niche to interest a buyer
for practical reasons. In such a case inefficiency in the market will arguably
have arisen, simply because there is no available and willing new potential
owner with the requisite expertise and experience to continue the company
in operation in its present form and location. Further, the absence of such an
owner arguably reduces, not merely local economic well-being, but overall
economic efficiency.
For convenience we will refer henceforth to this general class of situations
as the “departing founder scenario”—although much the same set of circumstances can arise generations after the original founder is gone, but while the
company is still closely held in local hands.
In the departing founder scenario, perhaps there ought to be a way, with
appropriate safeguards, for the company’s employees to form a collective
finance vehicle to purchase all the shares and continue operating the company themselves. That might be the best result from every point of view: The
employees are already on-site, and they have knowledge and expertise about
the company’s operations. Their collective assumption of ownership could
allow perpetuation of an economically viable enterprise, avoid loss of jobs,
and perhaps help preserve the economic vitality of the region.
One point to note is that the rationale for permitting collective ownership
in this case does not depend upon the notion that employee ownership is
generally a good idea—a proposition that, as discussed in Part II, is questionable. A second point is that, other than in the departing founder scenario,
it remains difficult to argue that any departure from prevailing regulation
should apply. In other situations, it is hard to see why investment in one’s
employer is different, and thus justifies different regulation, from any other
investment. The question seems particularly difficult to answer, for example,
if the company is public—meaning that in some sense outside ownership is
always available.
Even in the central, departing-founder-of-a-nonpublic-company scenario,
an investment vehicle permitting employees collectively to take ownership
of the employer should not generally be tax-subsidized or provided through
the retirement system, as ESOPs are. The suggestion is only that such a vehicle
should be permitted. As described in the next Part, however, under current
law a tax-subsidized ESOP is not only currently an available option: It is
likely the only legally viable, or at least clearly viable, alternative.
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IV. Securities Law Obstacles to Non-ESOP Employee Ownership
Under current securities law, a collective finance vehicle for employee ownership that is not an ESOP may be impermissible, or may at least be subject
to effectively disabling regulation. Exceptions might apply to some aspects
of such a vehicle’s operation, but that application is uncertain. And that very
uncertainty would itself make using the non-ESOP vehicle less desirable.
Potential problems arise with respect to both federal and state securities laws.
A. Federal Law
At the risk of oversimplifying, the Securities Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act)
requires the registration of certain securities transactions, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act) requires the registration of certain classes
of securities.31 ESOPs are a species of “qualified” retirement plan,32 and as such
are in many respects excused from those registration requirements.33 A collective finance vehicle that was not a qualified plan would lose those protections.
Similarly, the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the ’40 Act) requires
registration of investment companies and imposes substantial regulation but
excludes qualified plans from the definition of an investment company.34
Again, a non-ESOP investment vehicle could not avail itself of that exception.
Potentially, then, a non-ESOP vehicle designed to permit employees to buy
their employers’ shares might be subject to registration and other regulation
under the ’33, ’34, or ’40 Acts. In many instances, the vehicle might arguably be exempt under one or another Act for other reasons, but significant
uncertainty would remain, particularly in larger companies. For example,
under the ’34 Act, the investment vehicle would in many instances be exempt
from registration because its securities would not be traded on an exchange, it
would not have over $10 million in assets, and it would not have more than
500 shareholders who are not “accredited investors” as defined under the statute.35 Similarly, some such vehicles, at least initially, would have fewer than
100 beneficial owners and, therefore, would not be investment companies for
most purposes under the ’40 Act.36
Particularly over time, however, some collective finance vehicles would likely
exceed these numerical limits. Other potential exemptions from portions of
31
See Kirk F. Maldonado & Susan J. Daley, Securities Law Aspects of Employee Benefit Plans,
362-4th Tax Mgmt. Port. (BNA) Part II(C) and (D) (2008).
32
See generally I.R.C. § 401(a) (controlling requirements for plan qualification).
33
See generally Malonado & Daley, supra note 31, at Part II(D). One specific exemption, for
instance, is 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2), which exempts from registration under the ’33 Act certain
participation interests “issued in connection with . . . a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing
plan which meets the requirements for qualification under [section 401(a)].”
34
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11).
35
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15).
36
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (exempting, for most purposes, “[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities . . . are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is
not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities”).
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the securities laws might exist, but their application would be uncertain, and
in any event might reach only some, but not all, collective finance vehicles.37
If a nonretirement-plan alternative for employee ownership is to have a
chance to succeed, it would need clear authorization under federal securities
law, as well as an accompanying exemption from state laws regulating securities.
B. State “Blue Sky” Laws
Individual states have adopted so-called “blue sky” laws designed to combat
fraud. Although these laws vary, they commonly require registration of securities transactions. Under current law, because ESOPs are treated as employee
benefit plans, they benefit from ERISA’s sweeping preemption of state and
local laws. Although ERISA’s preemption provision excludes state laws that
regulate securities, it also forbids states from treating employee benefit plans
as if they were investment companies.38 In addition, many state codes include
express exemptions for transactions involving employee benefit plans.39
An employee ownership vehicle that was not an employee benefit plan
would lose the benefit of ERISA preemption. In some states, it might be
exempt from some or all “blue sky” requirements, but the organizers of the
vehicle would have to investigate that possibility in every potentially relevant state, and then regularly monitor those states’ laws for any important
changes. Even assuming that exemptions might apply, the resulting uncertainty and expense would itself reduce the incentive to form non-ESOP
employee ownership vehicles.
V. A Proposal
As we have shown in Part II, the existing ESOP legal regime is not justifiable and seems a good candidate, as a matter of policy, for elimination. As
described in Part III, however, there seems to be a reasonable policy argument,
in certain limited contexts like the retiring founder scenario, for permitting collective employee ownership. As just demonstrated in Part IV, simply
eliminating ESOPs would leave, apparently, no clear legal option available to
achieve that result.
37
Under the ’40 Act, for example, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(12) (excluding from the definition of an investment company “[a]ny voting trust the assets of which consist exclusively of
securities of a single issuer which is not an investment company”); 80a-3(b)(1) (excluding an
entity that is “primarily engaged . . . , through a wholly-owned subsidiary . . . , in a business or
businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities”);
80a-6(b) (excluding “employees’ security companies”). The ’34 Act exempts from registration
securities issued by certain cooperatives, but the exemption is limited to farming cooperatives
and others in which the commodity or service supplied is primarily for the benefit of members.
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(E)–(F). That limitation and others would make the cooperative form
impractical in most departing-founder situations.
38
The sweeping preemption provision is ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The exception for securities laws and the prohibition on “deeming” a plan or its trust to be an investment
company are in ERISA § 514(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2).
39
See, e.g., MCLA § 451.2202(u) (Michigan).
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In light of the above, we propose that Congress consider overhauling federal securities laws to permit collective employee ownership through a trust in
certain circumstances, while removing from the tax law and ERISA the existing ESOP subsidies and exemptions. We call such a trust a “TEST,” standing
for “taxable employee stock trust.”
Our proposal is limited to the departing founder scenario; it does not
extend to scenarios—involving public companies, for example—where the
circumstances that recommend permitting a collective ownership structure
are not present. Moreover, in part for simplicity and because the existing
economic model is now well understood, we believe the proposed vehicle
should generally function like an ESOP (and permit comparable borrowing to finance stock purchases) without most of the tax subsidies and without “retirement plan” characterization, treatment, or regulation. In brief, we
suggest that a system be created that would allow nonsubsidized employee
ownership, provided employees do in fact have meaningful ownership and
provided many of the same statutory protections in place under the current
ESOP system remain.
Implementing this proposal would involve amending federal securities and
tax law, as well as ERISA. The principal revisions required under our suggested approach are as follows.
A. Securities Law
As discussed in Part IV, it may be legally permissible even under current
securities laws to create and operate a collectively owned employee ownership
structure. That point is not clear, however, and so a major emphasis of our proposal would be to remove doubt about this securities-regulation conclusion.
Accordingly, explicit exemptions would be provided under the Securities
and Exchange Acts for entities that meet the requirements listed below.
The new form of entity would be regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), rather than by the Department of Labor, under a model
more like that applicable to mutual funds under the ’40 Act. We make this
suggestion, again, because employee collective ownership vehicles are not
properly considered “retirement” vehicles and, therefore, do not really fall
within the expertise of the Department of Labor. They are, rather, investment
vehicles much more akin to the types of arrangements typically overseen by
the SEC. Furthermore, without any tax subsidy, there would be no reason to
involve the Service.40

40
We recognize there may be policy reasons in some cases for providing for “enforcement
diversity.” See Dana Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs Are Necessary to Keep the Foxes Out of the Henhouse?, 53 Am. Bus.
L. J. 33 (2016). However, we think such goals could be better achieved, in the case of a TEST,
by supplementing SEC oversight with a private right of action for participants, rather than by
involving the Service in an essentially investment-regulatory context in which that agency has
limited expertise.
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Moreover, the SEC requirements and oversight to which TESTs would
be subjected could safely be limited, in our view. Many of the substantive
issues traditionally the subject of securities law—aggressive sales practices;
incomplete financial disclosure to potential purchasers—do not fully apply
to nonvoluntary transfer arrangements such as a TEST (or an ESOP). These
arrangements do not involve, at least directly, a “purchase decision” in the
same way as does an offer to sell stock or mutual fund shares to an investor.
Of course, in an abstract sense an employee could be thought of as purchasing TEST or ESOP interests in exchange for agreeing to provide his or
her labor. That is not, however, an argument the courts or the SEC have
ever found persuasive in the case of “nonvoluntary,” nonelective employee
arrangements.41 And, indeed, in practical terms it does seem a stretch to treat
as subject to full securities-based oversight situations where an interest in
employer stock is simply provided as part of an employee’s compensation
package without regard to his or her preference or choice. This is effectively
just one case of in-kind labor compensation (one could also imagine, for
example, compensating employees in the form of gold bullion, or kitchen
appliances, or food) and is, we think, best left to the direct regulation of labor
compensation through, for example, minimum wage and state wage-andhour laws as well as the functional market for personal services, which should
only rarely leave an employer with any practical alternative but to pay the
bulk of compensation in the form of cash wages. An individual’s decision to
work or not to work for a particular employer under such circumstances—
which would serve as the sole conceptual basis for regarding the transaction
as a “securities purchase”—is likely to be in practice only tangentially driven,
at most, by the individual’s evaluation of the company’s stock investment
prospects.42
Certainly, basic antifraud securities rules should apply. Employers should
not be permitted to entice prospective employees (or to retain existing
ones) by lying about their prospects for enrichment through TEST interests. Extensive and formalized disclosure, however, of the type required of
mutual funds (under the ’40 Act) and individual company stock offered for
sale to the public (under the ’33 Act) seems unjustified. Among other things,
the current-law ESOP protections that we envision continuing to apply to
TESTs, as described below, would effectively address most of the concerns to
which, in the case of stock sales, securities disclosure rules are directed.

41
Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Exchange Act Release No. 33-6188,
45 Fed. Reg. 8,960 (Feb. 11, 1980); Exchange Act Release No. 33-6281, 46 Fed. Reg. 8,446
(Jan. 27, 1981). For a good discussion of the (often somewhat incoherent) historical judicial
treatment of this issue, see Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities
Laws, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 1195 (2003).
42
If this empirical prediction were proved wrong, and rank-and-file employees were shown
to be making employment decisions based, for example, on questionable or aggressive touting
of stock prospects, then our recommendations would be subject to reconsideration.
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The securities law exceptions would also, under our proposal, preempt state
securities (“blue sky”) regulation, in order to replicate the preemptive securities-regulation benefit now enjoyed by ESOPs.
B. Tax Law
With certain significant exceptions specifically targeted to the departing
founder scenario, no tax subsidies would be extended to the new entity. This
has the following implications.
1. Taxation of the Trust
The trust through which employees own stock would be taxable under the
usual rules that apply to an ordinary nongrantor trust. This may not be particularly consequential, depending on demographics and cash-flow patterns.
The income of such a trust is generally taxable, but the trust is at the same
time entitled to deduct distributions made to beneficiaries.43 The trust would
be expected to realize taxable gains only upon liquidating employer stock—a
relatively infrequent occurrence and one that would coincide with deductible
distributions to participants.
2. Taxation of Participants
Employees would be taxed on their vested share of contributions to the
trust under section 83 (in precisely the same way direct compensatory stock
grants are taxed). That is, the fair market value of participants’ vested interests
in the trust would be taxable as ordinary income on the later of the date of
grant or of vesting, and no further tax consequences would arise until the
employees’ interests were liquidated, at which time any gain or loss would be
treated as capital in character.
Removing employer securities from the qualified plan taxation regime and,
as described below, from the universe of permitted employee plan investments under ERISA would have collateral consequences. One consequence
would be that current section 402(e)(4), which permits favorable capital-gain
treatment of unrealized investment gains on employer securities distributed
from an employee benefit plan, would no longer be required.
3. Taxation of Transferor
We suggest, however, that the deferral of a seller’s gain upon sale of stock
to the trust, which is currently provided for under section 1042, continue to
be permitted under generally the same conditions as currently apply. These
conditions include that the seller of the securities have held them at least three
years before transfer to the TEST, and that the trust must hold at least 30% of

43
See Andrew W. Stumpff, The Unimportance of Being a VEBA: Tax Attributes of Nonexempt
Welfare Benefit Trusts, 47 Tax Law. 113 (1995).
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the stock after the sale.44 This would actually continue to encourage departing
founders to sell going concerns to their workforce, rather than liquidate or
otherwise “cash out” to the detriment of the employees and local stakeholders.
We would go even further, in fact, and suggest Congress consider creating
a new tax subsidy, consisting of full or partial deduction of the fair market
value of any stock donated (not sold) by the departing founder to a TEST.
We would condition this deduction on the same conditions as are necessary
for section 1042 treatment, as well as other requirements including that the
transfer is a bona fide gift45 and that the taxpayer is not related to employees
owning 50% or more of the trust interests.
Both of these subsidies, in the departing founder scenario, seem consonant with the long-accepted idea of tax-subsidizing charitable activity—the
“charity” in this case being the public benefit of preserving local jobs and the
economic vitality of the company’s geographical environs.
C. ERISA
The statutory retirement plan exemptions (from ERISA’s diversification
and prudence requirements) for employer stock investment would be eliminated. This change would effectively remove employee stock-ownership plans
from the retirement system.
D. Conditions
The rationale that would extend liberalization of securities law specifically
to employee ownership vehicles applies only under certain circumstances.
Accordingly, restrictions (which would be spelled out in the text of the
Securities and Exchange Acts) should apply to the availability of the exemption, as follows:
1. Private Employers
To be eligible, the employer-company could not be publicly traded immediately before creation of the TEST. In the publicly traded case, there would
be no need for relaxing the securities laws, and no rationale would exist for
facilitating collective employee ownership, since a functioning ownership
market would already exist.

44
We do not suggest this requirement as a condition for permissibility of the vehicle but
only as a condition for this particular tax benefit.
45
This may, in turn, require as a conceptual matter that the departing founder give up (by
the transfer itself, or in combination with a sale of other shares) any remaining ownership in
the company. Regulations under section 83 currently treat (soundly, it would appear, as a matter of logic) a transfer of property from a corporation’s continuing shareholder to its employee
not as a gift but, instead, generally as a deemed contribution to corporate capital (increasing
the shareholder’s basis in retained shares), followed by a compensatory payment by the corporation to the employee. Reg. § 1.83-6(d)(1).
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2. Employee Owners Only
Acquisition of trust interests would be limited to employees of the issuer
or their inheritors. Otherwise, again, the policy rationale underlying the
securities-law exemption would not apply: The acquisition of an interest in
the trust by someone other than an employee would have much more the
character of an ordinary “investment” transaction, of the sort which existing
securities laws are fundamentally intended to protect.
3. Additional Retirement Benefits
ESOP supporters routinely justify the investment concentration inherent
in such arrangements by arguing that most employers also maintain, in addition to the ESOP, some other retirement plan with more defensibly diversified investments, such as a section 401(k) plan. We think it would be a good
idea to call employee-ownership advocates on this claim—and, more to the
point, to ensure that a TEST is not maintained as an economic substitute for
meaningful, diversified workforce retirement savings. Accordingly, we suggest
that as a condition to adoption of a TEST, an employer be required also to
establish and maintain a conventional retirement plan, providing benefits at
least as favorable as those required under a “safe-harbor” plan under section
401(k)(12).46
4. Continued ESOP Protections
Employees holding interests in a TEST would be at financial risk even
under our proposal. Accordingly, we suggest that several of the substantive
requirements currently applicable to ESOPs would continue to apply to
these arrangements. The following are the principal existing requirements for
ESOPs, with a brief discussion of whether each should continue in effect
under our proposal, and why.
Security Class. To qualify currently as an ESOP, a plan must primarily
invest in “qualifying employer securities,” which are defined in section 409(l)
and ERISA section 407(d)(5) to mean, in the case of a nonpublicly traded
company, common stock having voting and dividend rights at least as favorable as any other class of the company’s common stock. We suggest retaining this requirement, as a way of discouraging manipulation of the TEST
rules to create nominally employee-owned vehicles that in reality function as
mere financing schemes. We believe the argument for encouraging collective

46
Section 401(k)(12) establishes two alternative design-based “safe harbors,” which if
adopted relieve the employer from having to test contributions for prohibited discrimination
in favor of highly compensated employees under the usual “actual deferral percentage” or
“actual contribution percentage” tests. The first safe harbor applies if the employer matches
specified proportions of participants’ elective contributions; the second, alternative safe harbor
applies if the employer simply agrees to make nonelective contributions (in addition to the
participants’ elective contributions) of at least three percent of compensation.
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employee ownership is most plausible only when no other party can be found
who is willing to purchase a controlling interest.
Valuation. Section 401(a)(28)(C) requires that nonpublicly traded stock
held by an ESOP be valued by an “independent appraiser” meeting requirements set forth in Treasury regulations. We would continue this requirement
in effect (and, because our proposal would apply only to nonpublic companies in the first place, the limitation to “nonpublic” under this rule would no
longer be necessary).
Liquidity. Current ESOP law contains a number of protections aimed at
the general problems of diversification and liquidity, given the concentrated
financial risk inherent in the idea of an ESOP. Section 409(o), for example,
sets forth a distribution requirement, pursuant to which a participant generally must be able to elect full distribution over no more than a five-year
period commencing within a year after retirement, disability, or death; and
commencing within five years of any other separation from service. We suggest that this requirement be retained for its protective effect and because the
foundational idea is that current employees would be owners of the TEST—
not that retired employees’ wealth would continue indefinitely to be tied to
their former employer.
Section 401(a)(28)(B) currently provides that ESOP participants who have
attained age 55 with ten years of participation must be given, each year for
six years, the right to elect to diversify a portion of their account balances
(eventually up to 50% of the accounts’ value) through either distribution or
investment in other investment options. This requirement seems to depend
for its policy rationale on the idea of an ESOP as a retirement plan; and we
would not suggest continuing it.
To protect employees as investors, we would, however, leave in place the
requirements of section 409(h). Under that provision, a participant must
have the right to demand securities as a form of distribution. If the participant demands and receives such a distribution, the participant must have a
“put” right, exercisable for 60 days after distribution, to compel the company
to repurchase the shares so distributed for fair market value.
Governance Pass-Through (e.g., Share Voting Rights). Section 409(e) generally requires, with certain exceptions, that employees be provided the right to
direct the voting of shares allocated to their accounts. We would continue this
requirement to avoid TESTs being used simply as financing schemes.
All the above continuing safeguards would be moved from the Code,
instead becoming conditions to the securities law exemptions described
above. As noted above, we suggest that the SEC, not the Department of
Labor or the Service, be placed in charge of interpreting and enforcing all
these continuing requirements.
VI. Conclusion
ESOPs in their current form are indefensible as a matter of national retirement plan and tax policy. The major argument ESOP supporters have put
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 72, No. 2
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forward for such arrangements is that employee ownership is a particularly
successful way to organize economic entities. If that is the case, then government subsidies—let alone subsidies extended through the retirement
system—are unnecessary and inappropriate: employee ownership vehicles
need simply be permitted. Our proposal would accomplish this in a targeted
way while removing ESOPs from the retirement system. The rationale for
permitting employee ownership vehicles is particularly strong in the case of
smaller companies when the founding or sole owner is withdrawing or has
died, and our proposal would actually expand the incentives for employee
ownership in that context. One advantage of the proposal is that it seems
potentially (slightly) more politically viable than simple abolition of ESOPs
with no replacement.
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